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206 ANALYSIS 
Off goes the train again. 'It might follow, perhaps, that whichever 
of us has the lesser can pin the greater on the other. For instance, if 
B were here, we could have a little dialogue, which went "I do not 
know who is greater", "Nor I", "Nor I", and so on until we reached 
the lower number. At that point its owner would say, "I know that 
yours is greater!". We could even conduct the dialogue in silence, if 
we had a convention that each second's silence represented a failure 
to deduce who was greater. But, no, without this source of extra 
premises, neither of us can know that he is the lesser. So C is still 
right.' 
Another rude whistle comes from the engine. 'Of course each of 
us has to assume that the other is not stupid. But it is not asking 
much - it would be plain enough to someone who chose 1 that the 
other number is greater; and this can be banked, in readiness for 
proving that, if C is right, no one chose 2. So, I fear, I can sum up 
pretty neatly. If C is right, no one chose any number. But I chose 
157. So C is wrong. So at least one of us can work out who has the 
greater number. I cannot. B cannot. So C is right.' 
At this moment the collector of inference tickets interrupts and 
the train of thought is broken. Readers of this journal are invited to 
sort the matter out. 
University of East Anglia, 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
?MARTIN HOLLIS 1984 
THERE IS NO SET OF ALL TRUTHS 
By PATRICK GRIM 
AN important philosophical consequence of Cantor's work has 
apparently been overlooked. There can be no set of all truths. 
I 
The proof is as follows. 
Suppose that there is a set of all truths 9: 
J= { T1 , T 3, 9,. *. * , 
and consider further all subsets of f, elements of the power set 97: 
{T2) 
({T3 
{ T1, T2} 
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{ T, T3} 
{T1, T2, T3} 
Now to each element of this power set will correspond a truth. 
To each element of the power set, for example, T1 either will or 
will not belong as a member. In either case we will have a truth: 
T1 E { T1} 
T1 t {T2} 
T1 { T3} 
T1,E {T1, T2} 
T1 E {T1, T3} 
T1 E {T1, T2, T3} 
There is of course nothing special about T1 here - we could have 
used any particular truth in its place. There are also myriad other 
ways of constructing a distinct truth for each element of the power 
set Y9'. 
To each element of the power set will correspond a distinct 
truth, and thus there will be at least as many truths as there are 
elements of the power set Yf. But by Cantor's power set theorem 
the power set of any set will be larger than the original.1 There will 
then be more truths than there are members of f-. Some truths 
must be left out, and thus f cannot, as assumed, be a set of all 
truths. 
II 
Let me mention just one application of the argument above, 
against a common approach to possible worlds. 
Possible worlds are often introduced as maximal consistent sets 
of propositions - proposition-saturated sets to which no further 
proposition can be added without precipitating inconsistency - or 
as some sort of fleshed-out correlates to such sets.2 The actual 
'See for example Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic, fifth edition (New York: Macmillan, 
1979), pp. 189-90. 
2See for example Robert Merrihew Adams, 'Theories of Actuality', Noeis, 17 (1974), 
211-31, and Alvin Plantinga's treatment of worlds in terms of books in God, Freedom, 
and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1980), pp. 35-44, and The Nature 
of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 44-69. 
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world, on such an account, is the maximal consistent set of proposi- 
tions all members of which actually obtain - a maximal and con- 
sistent set of all truths - or is an appropriately fleshed-out correlate 
to such a set. 
By the argument above, however, there can be no set of all 
truths. Any set of true propositions will leave some true proposition 
out, and thus there can be no maximal set of truths. Given this 
notion of possible worlds, then, there can be no actual world.3 
III 
The general argument above, of course, applies explicitly only 
against a set of all truths. It quite clearly relies, moreover, on 
a crucial assumption of bivalence regarding set membership. 
We might then hope to dispel the air of paradox and to save 
a category of all truths by recourse to many-valued set theories or 
to the non-set classes of alternative set theories. 
Here let me say simply that I am not sanguine about our pro- 
spects. Many-valued logics exhibit many-valued forms of the Liar 
and of Russell's paradox,4 and my guess is that they will exhibit 
many-valued forms of the Cantorian argument above as well. 
Alternative set theories seem capable of including a universal class 
only at some unacceptable cost, such as crippling mathematical 
induction.s My guess is that the same may hold for any attempt to 
include even a class of all truths. 
It might appear at first glance that there is a conflict between the 
Cantorian result above and Lindenbaum's Lemma, in terms of 
which we can construct maximal proof-theoretically consistent sets 
for familiar formal systems.6 The conflict is merely apparent, 
however, since (for one thing) Lindenbaum's Lemma relies crucially 
on the fact that wffs of such systems are explicitly finite. No such 
limitation is imposed on the truths of -in the Cantorian argument. 
Lindenbaum's Lemma can be seen, however, as preserving 
a notion of maximal proof-theoretically consistent sets for certain 
systems, and possible worlds construed in terms of them, as 
important tools for the logician. The possible worlds that the 
Cantorian result impugns are those grander entities, corresponding 
to sets of all truths, so tempting to the metaphysician. 
State University of New York, 
Stony Brook, NY 11794, U.S.A. 
? PATRICK GRIM 1984 
3 For a similar argument against such an approach to possible worlds, using a variation 
on the Liar, see my 'Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience', American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 20 (1983), 265-76. 
4See esp. Nicholas Rescher, Many-Valued Logic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 
87-90, 206-12. 
sSee esp. W. V. 0. Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 
Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 287-389. 
6 See for example Geoffrey Hunter, Metalogic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1971), pp. 110-11 and 177-8, and Elliot Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic 
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 64-5 and 93. 
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